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NATURE OF THE CASE
The city, by ordinance, restricted to four the number
of all beer licenses and refused without other cause to issue
a Class A license to plaintiff for sale of beer in original
containers for off-premise consumption in its combination
grocery store-gasoline station.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
with prejudice without other pleadings or trial (R. 59).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a decree from this court reversing
the order of dismissal of

t~e

trial court, and adjudging that

in absence of cause found to be within the police power of
the city, the plaintiff is entitled to be issued a Class A beer
license.
MATERIAL FACTS
Plaintiff's complaint alleged in part as follows:

3. Pla~ntiff operates a business at 195 South
Highway 89-91 within the city limits of said
municipality consisting generally of the retail
sale of gasoline, other petroleum products,
groceries and food items under license issued by
said municipality. Prior to September 5, 1978,
plaintiff duly applied and tendered the fee for
a Class A retail license to sell beer on said
premises at 195 South Highway 89-91 in original
containers for consumption off the premises.
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The defeGdants declined to issue the license
for the reasons set forth in a letter dated
September 6, 1978, from the Honorable Robert
Palmquist, Mayor of North Salt Lake Corporation
which stated:
'
'D. J . Allred
598 West 2600 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010

1

Dear Mr. Allred:
Your application for a retail beer license
to sell beer at Triangle Oil Inc., 195 South
Highway 89, was reviewed by the City Council
at their regularly scheduled meeting on
September 5, 1978. Due to the size of North
Salt Lake and to the fact that there are now
seven active beer licenses in the city, the
council voted unanimously to disapprove your
request. Their action in no way reflects
upon you or your business. It merely reflects
the council 1 s feelings that there are now
sufficient beer outlets within the city.
Sincerely,
Robert Palmquist
Mayorn
4. Ordinance No. 77-8 enacted by de~endants on
December 20, 1977, which became effective December
20, 1977, is entitled, AN ORDINANCE REPEALING AND
REENACTING CHAPTER 9 OF TITLE 4 OF THE CITY CODE
OF NORTH SALT LAKE TO PROVIDE FOR THE SALE, REGULATION, LICENSING AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE SALE OF
BEER. Section 4-9-2 thereof provides:
n4-9-2. LICENSE TO SELL LIGHT BEER AT RETAIL.
It shall be unalwful for any person to engage
in the business of the sale of light beer at
retail, in bottles, other orginal containers,
or draft, within the corporate limits of the
city without first having procured a license
therefor from the council as hereinafter
provided. A separate license shall be required
for each place of sale and the license shall at
all times be conspicuously displayed in the
place to which it shall refer or for which it
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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shall be issued. All licenses shall comply
with the Liquor Control Act of Utah and the
regulations of 0he liquor control commission
and every license shall recite that it is
granted subject to revocation as hereinafter
provided."
The complaint also alleged that:
The said enabling statute does not provide that the
city may restrict the number of licenses issued nor
does it mention the sale ofbeer in "other original
containers!!, but mentions only sale at retail, in
bottles or draft.
Accordingly, the city is without right or
authority to enact an ordinance which restricts
the number of licenses issued and endeavors to
control sale of beer in cans or other original
containers except bottle or draft.
Section 4-9-3 of the city ordinance provides
in part:
"4-9-3. LICENSE PRIVILEGES.
A. Retail licenses issued hereunder shall be
of the following· kinds and shall carry the
following privileges and be numbered numerically commencing from the number one:
1. Class "A" retail license shall entitle
the licensee to sell beer on the licensed
premises in original containers for
consumption off the premises in accordance
with the Liquor Control Act of Utah and
the ordinances of the city."
Section 4-9-11 relates to restriction of numbers of licenses
to be issued and provides:
ITJ.
The total number of businesses licensed to
sell beer in the city of North Salt Lake Shall not
exceed four, provided that this ordinan~e shall
not operate to reduce the number of businesses
now licensed to sell beer whether issued by
this municipality of by the county if such
business is annexed, nor shall it affect
reapplications for such licenses."
The restriction does not appear in any enabling statute;
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- 4 it does not distinquish between licenses for sale
of beer for consumption off the premises under '.::las 3
A license from sale of beer for consumption en the
premises under a Class B license or consumption ~n
the premises with the sale of meals under a Class
C license.
The restriction of Class A licenses in not within
the power or authority of the defendants and has no
legal relationship to the police power of the city.
The trial court considered the written memoranda of the
parties and ordered that the complaint be "dismissed with
prejudice, failure to state a claim".
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

CITY HAS NO POWER TO RESTRICT THE
NUMBER OF CLASS A BEER LICENSES
WITHOUT PROOF OF NECESSITY THEREFOR
IN EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER.

Plaintiff operates one of its "Gas 'n Groceries" store
at North Salt Lake and applied for a Class A beer license

~i~

would have permitted plaintiff to sell beer in original containers for consumption off the premises.

Defendant city

council refused to issue a license for the sole stated.reason
that there were presently sufficient beer outlets within the
city.

The city ordinance fixes the number of businesses

licensed to sell beer at four without specifying any division
among Classes A, B or C.

Class B would allow consumption on

the premises in containers or draft, and Class C allows
similar consumption on premises only in connection witr. the
sale of meals.
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- 5 Plaintiff contends that city has no power to restrict
the number of Class A beer licenses for the reason that such
power has not been invested in the city by statute; that any
power to regulate must have an intimate relationship to the
public health, welfare or morals based upon evidence and facts;
and that the provision allowing a reapplication by the same
licensee for one of the restricted licenses is invalid.
Historically, the laws of Utah, 1935, Section 89, vested
the Liquor Control Commission with authority to grant licenses
to sell light beer at retail for off premises consumption and
draft on premises.

Section 91 established a limitation on the

number of licenses for sale of light beer on draft according
to population, but made no restriction on licensing for sale
of beer in containers for off premise consumption.

The laws

of 1937 changed the act to allow licensing by cities under
language as follows:
32-4-17. Light beer-Sales to minors. (a) Cities
and towns within their corporate limits, and counties
outside of incorporated cities and towns shall have
power to licen$e, tax, regulate or prohibit the sale
of light beer, at retail, in bottles or draft;
provided, that no such licP.nses shall be granted
to sell beer in any dance hall, theater or in the
proximity of any church or school. The commission
granting the license shall have authority to
determine in each case what shall constitute
proximity.
The words "license", "tax" and "regulate" are the identical
words used in 10-8-39 which authorizes cities to license certain
businesses.

The word "prohibit" is used in 10-8-42 which dates
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back to 1898 and this section reads:

10-8-42. Intoxicating liquors-Regulation. Tl'.e:/
may prohibit, except as provided by law, any person
from knowlingly having in his possession any
intoxicating liquor, and the manufacture, sale,
keeping or storing for sale, offering or exposing
for sale, importing, carrying, transporting,
advertising, distributing, giving away, exchanging,
dispensing or serving of intoxicating liquors.
Thus .32-4-17 added nothing by way of power of cities to prohik I
I

sales since this authority to prohibit under 10-8-42 antedates
I
I
the former. The authority to limit Class A licenses must be
found apart from the right to prohibit.

Does the word "regula)
I

give such authority to restrict the number?

Appellant contends

it would do so only to the extent the city reasonably finds it
necessary in exercise of its police power.

The sale of beer

in original containers for off premise consumption is not a
nuisance per se, nor an evil recognized by statute or otherwise
as requiring restriction.

This is borne out by at least the

following facts:

(1)

The ordinance itself defines "nuisance"

under 5 categories, none of which includes Class A
situations.

(2)

The Liquor Control Act, .32-1-2, defines

police power as it relates to liquor in controlling
saloons and unlawful selling:

32-1-2. This act shall be deemed an exercise
of the police powers of the state for the protection of the public health, peace and morals;
to prevent the recurrence of abuses associated
with saloons; to eliminate the evils of unlicenses
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- 7 and unalwf~l manufacture, selling and disposing
of alcoholic beverages; and all provisions of
this act shall be liberally construed for the
attairunent of these purposes.
(3)

It is not unlawful to drink alcohol and

even to drive a vehicle if the amount of alcohol in the
blood is .05 percent or less, which would be at least
two bottles of beer (41-6-44).
(4)

Acts characterized as evil or immoral as

a matter of religion are not necessarily evil or immoral
as a matter of law.
We acknowledge the right of the state to restrict
licensing and withhold licensing without the necessity of giving
any reason therefor.

And, if specifically legislated, the state

could authorize the limiting or restricting of licenses by
cities.
right.

However, in absence of statute the city has no such
This is set forth in the annotations in 163 ALR 581 from

which we quote on page 582 as follows:
Municipalities, too, when they are invested by
state legislatures with the power to do so, may
limit the number of liquor licenses which may be
issued within their jurisdictions. State ex rel.
Dixie Inn v. Miami (Fla) (reported herwith) ante,
577; Hall v. Kewanee (1942) 379 Ill 176, 39 NE2d
1009; Alamogordo Improv. Co. v. Prendergast (1940)
45 NM 40, 109 P2d 254; State ex rel. Saperstein v.
Bass (1941) 177 Tenn 609, 152 SW2d 236.
But it seems that municipal control may be
superseded by a state beverage act which d?es
not limit the number of licenses anywhere in
the state, and reserves to municipalities only
the right to enact ordinances regulating the
hours of business and the location of places of
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business, and prescribing sani~ary conditions.
City of Miami v. Kichinko (1945) Fla 22 So2d
627, 630. In this case the ccurt held invalid
an ordinance which limited the number of lquor
licenses according to population.
Since 32-4-17 utilizes the words license, tax and
regulate similarly as contained in the licensing power of citi<
under 10-8-39, we analyze some cases dealing with the word
"regulate" in connection with the latter.
In Salt Lake Citz v Revene

(1942) 124 P2d 537' where

the city sought to limit the hours which a barber shop could
remain open in affirming the lower court in sustaining a
demurrer to the complaint, Justice Wolfe wrote:
[2] The municipality being a creature of the
state delegated powers, the question arising here
is whether this ordinance is within the police
power delegated under Section 15-8-39; to nlicense,
tax and regulate".
[3 ,4] The word nregulate" is difficult to define
in other terms because it involves a conception for
which it stands more accurately than any synonym.
It involves the making of a rule in reference to
the subject to be regulated. Webster's International Distionary, (2nd Edition), defines the
word to mean "to bring under the control of law
or constituted authorityn. The rule making power
given to cities in reference to barber shops does
not mean any rule but such rules reasonably related
and designed to protect the health of the public.
In Ogden City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556, 182 P.530,
532, 5 A.L.R. 960, this court after defining
regulation, said, "the foregoing illustrations are
quite sufficient to show that, where the power
'to regulate' a particular calling or business is
conferred on a city, it authorized such city to
prescribe and enforce all such proper and reasonable rules and regulations as may be deemed
necessary and wholesome in conducting the business
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- 9 in a proper and orderly manner."
[5,6] The question resolves itself to this:
Is the fixing of closing hours a reasonable
regulation within the scope of the delegated
police power, i.e. has it a reasonable relationship to the protection of health of the
public?
Apparently the court found as a matter of law that regulating
the hours of barbers had no relation to public health.

Like-

wise, it would appear to be equally a matter of law that the
limiting of the number of Class A licenses has no relation to
public health, since such beer could readily be purchased from
other licensees in and about North Salt Lake.

No one could

prove that the health of residents of North Salt Lake would be
effected whether there were 100 such licenses or none at all.
Of course, the action of the city council in limiting
licenses may be symbolic of the feelings of the council and many
of their constituents that alcohol is evil and its use should
be prohibited, however, this philosophy in a democracy should
not be visited upon persons whose attitude toward moderate use
of beeris that it is moral, lawful and less harmful than
consumption of some softer beverages.
POINT II.

THIS ATTEMPT TO LIMIT CLASS A BEER
LICENSES IS ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE
AND DISCRIMINATORY.

Plaintiff's place of business is on U. S. Highway 91
and is the last business location selling groceries and gasoline
at the south end of the city.
In Smith v. Barrett,

It is properly zoned for business.
20 P2d 864, Utah (1933) it was
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held that to attempt to limit gasoline service stations by
requiring consent of adjoining property owners even though
the property was within a zone allowing gas sta ti ems, ·l'las net
allowable under the general welfare clause.

A filling

statio~.

is not a nuisance per se even though it may be operated to
become a public or private nuisance according to the opinion
which quoted the following with approval:
"Under the Constitution, arbitrary power cannot
be conferred upon the city council in the exercise
of the police power of any other power it possesses.
A gasoline filling station, properly constructed
and properly operated, is not per se a nuisance.
The city council may by reasonable ordinances
establish zoning districts or define how gas
filling stations may be constructed and how
operated. But arbitray power to allow a gas
filling station on one man 1 s property and disallow
it to another, without any definite rule by which
the city council is to be ·governed, cannot be
conferred, for this would be to give it power
to deny equal rights to all the citizens."
[7] Is it any less arbitrary, unreasonable,
or discriminatory for a board of city commissioners
to confer upon the owners of a specified foot
frontage arbitrary power to allow a gas filling
station on one man 1 s property and, by refusal
of consent, disallow it to another, than for a
Legislature to confer a like power upon a city
commission without a definite rule by which such
action should be governed? We observe none, and,
further, find no such power conferred by statute
in this state.
The court further stated that such arbitrary power would deny
equal rights to all citizens presumably under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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POINT III.

WITHOUT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING A NEED
TO RESTRICT THIS LICENSE THE ORDER
OF DISMISSAL WAS ERROR.

Justice Crockett, in the case of Ritholz v. City of
Salt Lake, 3 U2d 385, Sec. 284 P2d 702, Utah (1955), where the
city by ordinance prohibited the advertising of prices for
eyeglasses, held that this was not within the powers granted
cities nor was it authorized under general authority of l0-8-84
to preserve the safety, health and morals of the city.

The

court stated that cities are creatures of statute and limited
in powers to those delegated by the Legislature, which powers
should be strictly construed.

We quote in part from this

opinion:
"In this particular context the power to regulate
business can mean only such regulations as are
reasonably and substantially related to the safeguarding of the public health which raises the
question whether the advertising proscribed by
the ordinance bears such a relation. This
involves consideration of the constitutional as
well as the ultra vires problem since the city
cannot be authorized to do what the legislature
itself has not the power to do.
To begin with, we observe that the city offered
no evidence at the trial to show any relationship
between advertising eyewear and public health.
There is urged before us only conclusions of law
made by other courts, preswnably upon the basis
of some factual showing in each case. But we
disregard this deficiency in the presentation of
evidence and consider the contentions presented
to us. 11
I would appear from Justice Crockett's opinion that
evidence would have to be produced to justify the exercise of
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limi ta ti on which defendants seek to place upon Class A licensc: 3 .
We have reviewed 32-1-8 which delineates the subjec:s
of regulation by the commission, and none of which seek to
restrict licensing under the guise of regulation.

Also a

review of 10-8-43 through 10-8-46 with respect to power of
cities to regulate certain businesses such as food markets,
sale of food and plumbing functions indicates what the legislature had in mind in the use of the words "regulate" or
"regulation".
POINT DJ.

BEER LICENSING IS ENTITLED TO THE
SAME REASONABLE TREATMENT AS OTHER
BUSINESSES.

In the case of Anderson v. Utah County Board of Commissioners, (1979) 589 P2d 1214, this court stated:
The same considerations of fundamental fairness
and justice which prevent an administrative body
from acting in a capricious or arbitrary manner
in other areas of the law also apply in a beer
license, even thougl. it is a business which is
subjected to a high degree of supervision and
regulation in the interest of the public welfare.
This same Anderson case also held that a denial of an applicati::
for renewal of a Class B beer license to a tavern without prope;
findings was error.

Although the Anderson case held that in

support of the spirit of free enterprise an existing licensee
should be given preference on renewals where his business is
found upon such license as in the case of a Class B license
for a tavern, yet with respect to Class A licenses for grocery
stores, if any authority to limit exists, these should be
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rotated since beer is only one item of many upon which the
grocery business is founded and while not critical to continued
existence of the grocery store, it is a marked advantage which
should not be perpetuated in monopoly.

However, the proper

perspective is to hold that there is no basis to limit, in
the first place, the number of grocery stores with Class A
licenses.
CONCLUSION
The order of dismissal with prejudice of the plaintiff's
complaint should be reversed and the cause remanded to the
District Court to order the defendant city to issue a Class A
license to plaintiff in absence of reasonable evidence
supporting a need for restriction of Class A beer licenses
within the city in the proper exercise of its police power.
submitted,
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